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Curley: The Clean Air Act

THE EPA IS ONLY “SORT OF” PERMITTED TO REGULATE
GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: HOW
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V. EPA SHOWS THE
SUPREME COURT IS STILL HOT AND COLD ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
Kristen Curley*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent Supreme Court decision in Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA1 (“UARG”) addressed the scope of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) authority to regulate greenhouse gas2
(“GHG”) emissions from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act3
(“CAA” or “the Act”).4 In UARG, the Court examined the EPA’s
permitting requirements for stationary sources that emitted, or potentially would emit, GHGs.5 The Court determined that the EPA is not
authorized to regulate a stationary source based on its potential to
emit GHGs, and that stationary sources’ emissions of GHGs cannot
alone trigger the CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration6
*

J.D. Candidate 2016, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.S.W., Adelphi
University; B.A. Sociology, St. Joseph’s College. I would like to thank Professor Sarah Adams-Schoen for her guidance and support, and Alyssa Wanser for her advice and assistance
throughout the editing process. Most importantly, I thank my family.
1
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
2
GHGs are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere. They include carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases. Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere by the burning of
fossil fuels, trees, and also as a byproduct of some chemical reactions. See Overview of
Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
3
42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7515 (2014).
4
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2438.
5
Id. at 2438-42.
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (providing that “each applicable implementation plan shall contain
emission limitations . . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in each region (or
portion thereof) designated pursuant to section 7407 of this title as attainment or unclassifiable.”). Title V imposes both permitting and reporting requirements, but does not include any
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(“PSD”) program or Title V permitting requirements.7 The Court
based this determination upon its interpretation of the term “any air
pollutant” and whether that term should be inclusive of GHGs under
the PSD provision and Title V permitting requirements of the CAA.8
The Court further held that the EPA acted impermissibly in promulgating the Tailoring Rule,9 which adjusted numerical threshold limitations in order to provide more practical limits for GHG emissions.10
In its analysis, the Court examined the bounds of the EPA’s authority
under the CAA based upon both the statutory language and the
EPA’s regulatory history under the CAA.11
Arguably, the Court used a results-driven analysis, as it redefined the term “any air pollutant” solely for the PSD provision and
Title V, and determined that GHGs should not be included. Moreover, the Court, by invalidating the Tailoring Rule, effectively stated
that the EPA is limited in its authority to regulate GHGs under the
CAA, despite knowledge of the dangers of GHG emissions to public
health and welfare.12 This Comment will compare and contrast the
Court’s reasoning in UARG with its reasoning in previous GHG cases, and argue that the PSD provision and Title V permitting requirements should be inclusive of GHGs. Section II will introduce the
pertinent provisions of the CAA, and offer some history of its interpretation by the EPA and the Supreme Court. Section III will provide a summary of the Court’s decision in UARG as well as an analysis of the Court’s decision, and show how the UARG decision
digresses from the Congressional intent behind the CAA as well as
the Supreme Court’s past decisions concerning the EPA’s regulation
of GHGs under the Act.
II.

THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE EPA’S REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
Although this Comment centers on the Court’s decision in

substantive limitations on emissions. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2014).
7
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
8
Id. at 2439-40.
9
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
10
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446.
11
Id. at 2445.
12
Id. at 2446.
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UARG, the case cannot be understood without an understanding of
the general background of the CAA and the provisions pertinent to
the UARG decision. The CAA is a federal law designed to address
air pollution by requiring comprehensive state and federal regulation
for industrial and mobile sources of air pollution.13 The Act “regulates pollution-generating emissions from both stationary sources,14
such as factories and power plants, and moving sources, such as cars,
trucks, and aircraft.”15 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into
law on December 17, 1963, in order to respond to increasing concerns about air pollution, and the inadequacy of state and local ability
to regulate.16 The Act has since been amended to protect the public
from emerging hazards associated with air pollution.17 In 1970, the
Act was amended to delegate to the EPA the authority to direct the
air pollution control program in accordance with an objective of protecting public health, agricultural viability, and natural ecosystems.18
The EPA was given discretionary authority to promulgate regulations
that prescribe air quality standards and hold states accountable for
implementing and enforcing these standards.19
The 1977 Amendments expanded the Act further, establishing
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for air pollutants that pose known health and environmental risks.20 The Act, as
amended, requires stationary and mobile sources to comply with various air quality standards in order to maintain pollution levels at or
below the applicable NAAQS.21 Furthermore, the 1977 Amendments
provide for the authority of the EPA to add to this list of pollutants,
and set the NAAQS at levels it deems necessary to protect human
13

42 U.S.C. § 7401.
The CAA defines stationary source as “any building, structure, facility, or installation
which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C § 7411(a)(3).
15
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435.
16
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s
Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1585-88 (1991) (discussing tragic incidents
associated with air pollution, including one in which 200 deaths were attributed to “smog”
that had engulfed New York City in 1963).
17
Id. at 1588-91. The CAA was amended in 1965 to provide for federal control over
emissions of new automobiles. It was again amended in 1970 to give the Administrator of
the EPA the authority to prescribe NAAQS with the primary objective of protecting public
health.
18
Id. at 1591.
19
Id.
20
42 U.S.C. § 7410; see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435.
21
42 U.S.C. § 7407(d).
14
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health and welfare.22 The EPA has since used the CAA as a means of
regulating GHG emissions in some contexts due to the increasing
concern surrounding the effect of these emissions upon public health
and welfare, which has been approved in several instances by the Supreme Court.23 The continued evolution of the Act through numerous
amendments24 further evidences a Congressional purpose to “protect
and enhance an invaluable national resource, our clean air.”25
A.

The PSD Provision and Title V Permitting
Requirements

The PSD provision of the CAA26 requires certain sources in
“clean air areas”27 of the country to obtain a permit so that emissions
of air pollutants can be monitored and regulated, and degradation of
air quality can be prevented.28 The PSD program was created in order to prevent degradation of acceptable air quality in certain areas,
so that the air quality in these areas should not be degraded to levels
below those permitted by CAA standards.29 Pursuant to the Act, a
permit must be obtained before constructing or modifying any “major
emitting facility” in an area where PSD applies.30 In order to ensure
that the ambient air quality in “clean air” areas is maintained, each of
22
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1); Rich Raiders, Comment, How EPA Could Implement a Greenhouse Gas NAAQS, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 253-54 (2011).
23
See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
24
Reitze, supra note 16, at 1587-91.
25
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In the section of the
CAA entitled “Congressional declaration of purpose,” Congress stated that its purpose was
“to protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in
[EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution.” 42 U.S.C. §
7470(1).
26
The PSD program was created as a result of the 1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), in which the district court emphasized the congressional purpose of the CAA to protect and enhance air quality. Craig N. Oren, Prevention of
Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10
(1988).
27
The term “clean air areas” generally refers to regions of the country designated as having ambient air quality better than the applicable national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1).
28
John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deterioration under the Clean Air Act:
New Facility Permit Triggers, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,003, 10,006 (2008).
29
Id. at 10,003-04.
30
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1).
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the six pollutants for which the EPA established NAAQS, known as
“criteria pollutants,” is given a specific numerical threshold that designates the permissible concentration of the pollutant in the air. All
areas within each state are designated as “attainment” (meaning
“clean air”), “nonattainment” (or “dirty air”), or “unclassifiable” for
each criteria pollutant, based upon whether they have met the
NAAQS for each of the six criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide,
lead, nitrogen oxide, ozone, particle pollution, and sulfur dioxide.31
Every area of the country meets the NAAQS for at least one of these
pollutants and thus qualifies as an “attainment” or “clean air” area for
at least one criteria pollutant.32 Therefore, there is no area in the
country where PSD does not apply.33
Title V of the CAA34 sets forth the permitting requirements
for stationary and mobile sources, and explicitly states that major
emitting sources must apply for permits.35 Title V permits are general operating permits that serve as a single document containing all
control requirements that apply to a particular source for a particular
pollutant.36 For example, PSD permitting Best Available Control
Technology (“BACT”) requirements would be found on a Title V
permit. All “major sources” require a Title V permit.37
Because PSD permitting is both time and labor-intensive, it is
reserved for larger sources that emit higher levels of air pollutants
and, as a result, place areas at risk for significant deterioration of air
quality.38 PSD permits are required to construct or modify the operations of a “major emitting facility.”39 The sources subject to PSD
permit obligations include those major emitting facilities that emit, at
the defined levels, “any air pollutant.”40 A “major emitting facility”
31

42 U.S.C. § 7409.
Stensvaag, supra note 28, at 10,006-08.
33
Id.
34
42 U.S.C. § 7661a.
35
Id.; Meredith Wilensky, The Tailoring Rule: Exemplifying the Vital Role of Regulatory
Agencies in Environmental Protection, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 449, 458 (2011).
36
42 U.S.C. §7661a; Wilensky, supra note 35, at 458.
37
42 U.S.C. § 7661a.
38
Stensvaag, supra note 28, at 10,007-08.
39
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
40
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); see also Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal
of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg.
52,676 (1980). The 1980 rule applied the PSD permitting program to several pollutants for
which NAAQS had not been promulgated, including asbestos, beryllium, mercury, vinyl
32
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is defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons
per year or 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” depending upon
the type of source.41 This definition is not specific to any one pollutant, but refers to sources that emit quantities of any air pollutant that
exceeds the statutory threshold.42
Finally, in order to satisfy the PSD permitting requirements,
the source must comply with the BACT provision for each pollutant
subject to regulation under the Act, and utilize the best technology,
processes, and techniques available for reducing pollution emitted by
the applicant’s facility.43 Both new and modified stationary sources
must install technologies in compliance with BACT in order to control significant emissions of any regulated pollutant.44 Existing, unmodified sources that significantly increase their emissions of “any
air pollutant” are also subject to BACT.45
The EPA’s definition of “stationary source” within the PSD
provision was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.46 In Chevron, petitioners filed
for review of the EPA’s definition of “stationary source” under the
CAA.47 As the CAA required nonattainment states to regulate “new
or modified stationary sources,”48 the EPA used a definition of “stationary source” that referred to either a power plant as a whole, or

chloride, fluorides, sulfuric acid, total reduced sulfur/reduced sulfur, hydrogen sulfide, methyl mercaptan, dimethyl sulfide, dimethyl disulfide, carbon disulfide, and carbonyl sulfide.
Five non-NAAQS pollutants (fluorides, sulfuric acid mist, hydrogen sulfide, total reduced
sulfur, and reduced sulfur compounds) have been subject to the PSD program since the
EPA’s 1980 rule applied PSD to all regulated pollutants. Id. at 52,708-09.
41
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); see also Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 352.
42
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
43
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). The BACT provision provides:
The term “best available control technology” means an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject
to regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any
major emitting facility . . . through application of production processes
and available methods . . . for control of each such pollutant.
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
44
42 U.S.C. § 7475.
45
Id. In order to determine BACT, the EPA must identify which emissions control technologies are available. The available options are ranked by control and cost effectiveness in
order to determine the appropriate BACT. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,520.
46
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
47
Id. at 840.
48
42 U.S.C. § 7502.
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smaller units within the plant.49 The Court permitted the EPA to use
this definition, recognizing that Congress had conferred authority upon the EPA to regulate air pollution under the CAA.50 The Court reasoned that the EPA’s definition of the term was “a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in
reducing air pollution with economic growth.”51 According to Chevron, when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to an issue,
courts must defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.52 The Court in Chevron set the precedent of high
deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the ambiguous terms of the
CAA.
B.

The CAA as a Platform for Regulating GHGs

The EPA has used the Act as a platform for regulating GHGs,
as scientific research has demonstrated their harmful effects on humans and the environment.53 In 2009, the EPA announced its finding
that GHGs emitted by motor vehicles are the greatest cause of “human-induced climate change,” and that this poses a danger to public
health and welfare.54 This determination is known as the “Endangerment Finding,” which triggers the EPA’s duty to regulate GHGs
under the CAA.55 In Massachusetts v. EPA,56 a group of organizations petitioned the EPA to regulate motor vehicle emissions of
GHGs under the Act.57 The EPA argued that it lacked authority to
address climate change through the CAA and that regulation at that
time would be unwise.58 The Supreme Court held that GHG emis49

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
Id. at 866.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 843-44.
53
See Tailpipe Rule: Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Tailpipe Rule].
54
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment
Finding].
55
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34; Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,4976.
56
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
57
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513.
58
Id. The EPA claimed that it would be unwise because of lack of certainty of science
and because it might “hamper the President's ability to persuade key developing countries to
reduce [GHG] emissions.” Id. at 513-14.
50
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sions from motor vehicles could each be characterized as an “air pollutant” under the CAA so long as the EPA had first determined that
these emissions were a threat to human health and to the environment.59 Massachusetts established that carbon dioxide, which is
known as the most prevalent and harmful GHG, is an “air pollutant”
under § 7602(g) of the Act, which section defines “air pollutant” for
the NAAQS program.60 In Massachusetts, the Court emphasized that
“without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the [CAA] obsolete.”61 Massachusetts also emphasized the EPA’s duty to protect the health and welfare of the public.62 Furthermore, despite a high level of deference to
the EPA’s discretion, the Court in Massachusetts found that the EPA
was mandated to regulate GHG emissions as failing to regulate “presents a risk of harm . . . that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’ ”63 The
Court further asserted its position that the harms associated with
global warming are “serious and well recognized.”64
Because the CAA conferred authority on the EPA to regulate
threats to the environment, as well as human health and safety, the
Court held that the EPA was required to address these concerns by
59

Id. at 533.
Daniel Brian, Regulating Carbon Dioxide under the Clean Air Act as a Hazardous Air
Pollutant, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369, 378 (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) defines “air pollutant” as:
[A]ny air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material,
special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the extent
the Administrator has identified such precursor or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term “air pollutant” is used.
Id.
61
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 521.
64
Id.; see Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009):
As [GHG] emissions continue to increase, exponentially larger, and potentially more economically disruptive, emissions reductions will be
necessary in the future to bring atmospheric concentrations down to desired levels. Future technological advances, therefore, would likewise
have to be able to achieve those exponentially greater reductions to make
up for lost time.
Id.
60
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promulgating regulations under the CAA.65 In Massachusetts, the
Court recognized that the CAA’s drafters “might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming.”66 In that case, the Court concluded that the broad language of
the CAA indicates Congress’s intent to confer flexibility in interpretation.67 The Court further emphasized that the EPA is mandated to
regulate “any air pollutant” that presents a danger to public welfare.68
Massachusetts established the EPA’s duty to regulate GHGs if it determines that they are harmful, and that the EPA can no longer refuse
to act, unless it can support its inaction in the language of the CAA.69
In fact, in Massachusetts, the Court determined that the EPA is obligated to regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources under the
CAA if it makes an Endangerment Finding, or otherwise render the
CAA obsolete.70 The Court stated that the EPA has a responsibility
to regulate emission of GHGs to try and slow global warming, including regulations of both mobile and stationary sources. 71 As a result of the Endangerment Finding,72 the EPA began regulating GHGs
for mobile sources (the type of sources at issue in Massachusetts).73
The Supreme Court again addressed the EPA’s regulation of
GHGs under the Act in American Electric, in which plaintiffs sued
electric companies that operated power plants in twenty states based

65

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 532.
67
Id.; see also Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002)
(noting the expansive meaning of the word “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind” (internal quotations omitted)).
68
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
69
Id.
Under the clear terms of the [CAA], [the] EPA can avoid taking further
action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.
70
Id. at 532-33 (noting that even if Congress did not foresee global warming, it surely appreciated the need for regulatory flexibility in order to adapt to changing circumstances and
scientific developments in the area of air pollution).
71
Id. at 528-29.
72
Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497 (“[T]he Administrator finds that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health
and to endanger public welfare. . . . The Administrator has determined that the body of scientific evidence compellingly supports this finding.”).
73
See Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324.
66
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upon the “public nuisance” doctrine as applied to GHG emissions.74
The Court refused to allow these claims, determining that the EPA
regulations on GHG emissions displaced any public nuisance claim.75
In American Electric, the EPA was given deference as the expert in
the area of climate change risks, and the defendants were determined
to be legally operating within those limits.76 The Court plainly stated
that “emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to
regulation under the [CAA].”77 The CAA “entrusts such complex
balancing to [the] EPA in the first instance, in combination with state
regulators.”78 The Court’s decision in American Electric unequivocally supported the authority of the EPA to regulate GHGs, by way of
the reasoning in Chevron and Massachusetts.
C.

The Tailoring Rule Provided Workable Threshold
Limits for GHGs for the PSD Program

Massachusetts made clear that GHGs are “air pollutants” under the Act, and that, as such, the EPA has a responsibility to regulate
them if an Endangerment Finding is made.79 Thus, after making its
Endangerment Finding for GHGs,80 the EPA responded by enacting
the Tailoring Rule,81 a regulation that provided workable threshold
limits for GHGs under PSD.82 Because GHGs are emitted at much
higher concentrations than other air pollutants,83 the result of the PSD
threshold limits is that smaller sources like small businesses, hospitals, and apartment buildings, would be required to apply for a permit
under the PSD program, thus dramatically expanding the scope of the

74

Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2532.
Id. at 2540.
76
Id. at 2539.
77
Id. at 2537 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29).
78
Id. at 2539-40 (emphasizing that because Congress designated the EPA as the expert
agency to make determinations regarding GHGs, it is not within the authority of federal
judges, who lack the scientific resources and expertise, to determine what amount of GHG
emissions is “reasonable” and what level of reduction is feasible).
79
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
80
Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496.
81
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,514.
82
Id.
83
Matthew R. Oakes, Questioning the Use of Structure to Interpret Statutory Intent: A
Critique of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 124 YALE L.J. F. 56, 56 (2014).
75
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program.84 In order to avoid the PSD’s numerical threshold limits
becoming unworkable for GHGs, the EPA developed the Tailoring
Rule.85 The Tailoring Rule was issued in May 2010 in order to implement PSD and Title V permitting requirements for GHG emissions in phases, and to adapt the requirements in order to meaningfully regulate GHGs.86 To do so, the EPA relied upon its authority
under § 7601, which authorizes the EPA to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out [its] functions under [the CAA].”87
Under the Tailoring Rule, the EPA adjusted the threshold requirements under the CAA so that only major emitting sources or
those sources that emit GHGs at the highest levels must seek a permit
pursuant to PSD, so as to not affect small businesses, hospitals, and
the like.88 Particularly, the Tailoring Rule changed the threshold limits for GHGs from 100 and 250 tons per year depending on the type
of source, to 75,000 and 100,000 tons per year depending on the type
of source.89 The tailored thresholds limit the PSD permitting requirement to only those major sources that emit very large quantities
of GHGs. The EPA focused on those industrial sources responsible
for 70 percent of the GHG pollution from stationary sources, while
reserving some discretion for the EPA to identify the most costeffective emissions control options for major emitting sources.90 This
tailoring was consistent with Congress’s intent to subject only larger
emitting facilities to PSD and Title V permitting requirements.91
In enacting the Tailoring Rule, the EPA relied upon the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,92 which
invoked the “absurd results doctrine,” as well as the “administrative
necessity doctrine,” in order to adapt the PSD numerical thresholds to
GHG emissions.93 In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit determined
84
Id. at 56 (noting that “regulating GHG emissions at the levels apparently required by
the CAA would have increased the number of permitted sources at least a hundredfold”).
85
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437.
86
Id.
87
42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1).
88
Wilensky, supra note 35, at 459.
89
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
90
See Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Guidance and Technical Information Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingtoolsfs.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
91
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
92
636 F.2d 323 (1979).
93
Raiders, supra note 22, at 250.
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that the EPA must abide by statutory language unless its literal terms
would lead to absurd results.94 The “absurd results doctrine” thus authorizes agencies such as the EPA to apply statutory requirements
differently from the literal meaning, if necessary, to avoid absurd or
futile results that are at odds with the purpose of the legislation.95
The court in Alabama Power also acknowledged the agency’s need
for flexibility in determining when interpretations that depart from
the literal text of the statute are administratively necessary. 96 The
court further supported this finding with the “administrative necessity
doctrine,” which permits agencies to avoid the impossibilities of applying statutory requirements in certain circumstances.97 As a result,
the court sustained the EPA’s decision to excuse certain sources from
PSD review in order to avoid the absurd results that would ensue
from a literal interpretation of the statute.98
The EPA recognized that the application of the numerical
threshold limits of 100 and 250 tons per year for “major sources”
would be “absurd” if applied to GHGs because the PSD program’s
requirements would apply to sources for which the regulatory scheme
was not at all intended, such as sources as small as large singlefamily homes.99 In response to the dilemma created by the Supreme
Court’s insistence in Massachusetts that air pollutants include GHGs,
together with the practical difficulties that would result from utilizing
the existing 100 and 250 tons per year thresholds, the EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule, adjusting the threshold limits to meaningfully regulate GHGs and adopted a phase-in approach to the GHG
regulations in order to prevent the “absurd results” that would ensue
if the PSD program requirement were immediately applied to all stationary sources that emit GHGs at quantities above the statutory
thresholds.100 The EPA determined that it was administratively nec94

Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 353 (emphasizing the importance of Congressional intent
for interpreting language within the CAA).
95
Id. at 411 n.89.
96
Raiders, supra note 22, at 250; see also Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 357.
97
Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361; see also Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d
1267, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
98
Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361-62 (finding that PSD permitting requirements are
triggered by NAAQS and any other pollutants regulated under CAA).
99
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533.
100
Id. “[A]bsurd results” would ensue if the PSD and Title V programs’ requirements
were immediately applied to all stationary sources emitting GHGs in amounts above the
statutory thresholds. To avoid these consequences, the EPA prescribed higher thresholds for
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essary to adapt the numerical PSD thresholds to levels that were
meaningful for GHG emissions in order to avoid such unduly burdensome results. Thus, the Tailoring Rule was an attempt to preserve the
Congressional intent of maintaining safe levels of air pollutants that
are known to endanger public health and welfare.101
III.

UARG AND THE COURT’S ABRUPT LIMITATION ON THE
EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE CAA

In UARG, petitioners challenged the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under the PSD provision, which required certain GHGemitting sources to obtain permits.102 UARG concerned the permitting requirements for stationary sources under the PSD and Title V
provisions, as well as whether those sources were subject to the PSD
program’s BACT provision.103 The Court examined the language of
these provisions in order to determine whether the EPA acted within
the scope of its authority by concluding that the PSD program and Title V applied to GHGs, and implementing the Tailoring Rule to limit
the number of smaller sources required to obtain PSD permits and
thus become subject to the BACT provision.104 The Court’s decision
turned on the definition of “any air pollutant” within the PSD provision as well as within the Act as a whole.105 The Court emphasized
the importance of a reasonable statutory interpretation, and relied upon its past decisions in Chevron and Massachusetts, which set forth
the framework for EPA authority under the CAA, to reach its conclusion.106
The decision, written by Justice Scalia, consisted of three distinct holdings, which will be addressed in turn. First, the Court held
that stationary sources could not be subject to PSD permitting reGHGs, so that only the largest sources are affected.
101
Wilensky, supra note 35, at 474. “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 n.9.
102
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 2439-40, 2444-45; see supra Section II.A (discussing PSD program and BACT).
105
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441-42 (observing that the EPA is not bound by the Act-wide
definition of “air pollutant” when interpreting operative provisions of the Act such as the
PSD provision. In the Court’s view, the inclusion of GHGs in the definition of “any air pollutant” in this case would be incompatible with the program).
106
See generally UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427.
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quirements based upon their potential to emit GHGs.107 The Court
determined that the phrase “any air pollutant” within the PSD provision, used when describing the pollutants that trigger PSD and Title
V, did not include GHGs.108 Second, the Court found that the EPA
exceeded its authority when it adjusted the numerical limitations on
emissions from 100 and 250 tons per year to 75,000 and 100,000 tons
per year for GHGs in order to adapt the provision to workable levels
for GHGs.109 The Court reasoned that the numerical limits in the Act
were unambiguous and provided no room for interpretation by the
agency.110 Finally, the Court held that the EPA’s interpretation of the
phrase “each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act]”111 in the
PSD program’s BACT provision as including GHGs was a reasonable construction of the Act.112 Overall, under UARG, the EPA does
not have authority to regulate GHGs under Title V and PSD in clean
air areas, while sources that emit the threshold level of GHGs that are
already subject to PSD permitting requirements must comply with
BACT.
A.

The Court in UARG Held That the Term “Any Air
Pollutant” within the PSD Provision and Title V
Implicitly Excludes GHGs

The Court in UARG determined that the phrase “any air pollutant” does not include GHGs within the PSD provision and Title V.113
This determination was made despite the plain language of the statute, and does not appear to conform with Congress’s intent or the
Court’s previous mandate that the EPA take action if an Endangerment Finding is made.114 The CAA defines “air pollutant” as “any air
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological [or] radioactive substance . . . or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”115 The
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 2442.
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
Id. at 2445.
Id. at 2427.
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449.
Id. at 2442.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
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Court in Massachusetts affirmatively stated that GHGs are “air pollutants” subject to the Act.116 The PSD permit requirement applies to
major sources that emit “any air pollutant” at the defined levels.117
Historically, the EPA has interpreted PSD to apply to sources emitting any regulated air pollutant, even those for which it had not
promulgated NAAQS.118 However, the Court in UARG determined
that the EPA can no longer interpret the language “any air pollutant”
as inclusive of GHGs.119 The Court, in making this determination,
disregarded the plain language of the statute, namely, the word
“any,”120 as well as the Court’s prior holding that it is the EPA’s responsibility to act upon an Endangerment Finding with regard to
sources emitting GHGs.121
The Court relied upon Chevron to support this finding, reasoning that Congress did not intend for an expansion of the EPA’s
authority that would impact so many small sources as well as the
economy as a whole.122 However, according to the Court in Chevron,
the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA is subject to deference when the
statute is ambiguous or silent with regard to the issue, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable within the purpose of the statute.123
Thus, the “permissible construction” approach of Chevron requires
deference to the administrative agency’s (in this case, the EPA’s) reasonable construction of the statute when the statute is ambiguous, and
neither requires nor permits an evaluation of whether there are possible consequences of the agency’s statutory interpretation.124 As the
Court in Chevron first explained, when Congress has not spoken directly to the issue and an administrative agency has addressed Congress’s silence, “the court [cannot] simply impose its own construction [of] the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
116

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
118
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
119
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441.
120
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (subjecting “stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or
have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant” to PSD
requirements).
121
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
122
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-43.
123
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
124
Id. at 866 n.20 (citing Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524,
55,527 (1976) (“[T]he Act does not allow economic growth to be accommodated at the expense of the public health.”)).
117
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administrative interpretation.”125
The Court in UARG treated the term “any air pollutant” as
ambiguous in its analysis, asserting that inclusion of GHGs in this
term would be inconsistent with the statute as a whole.126 Presuming
that Congress had not spoken directly to the question at issue, the
Court then determined that the EPA’s inclusion of GHGs under the
PSD requirement was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute,
but yet it found that the inclusion of GHGs under the BACT provision was a reasonable construction of the statute.127 The Court’s
reading of the term “any air pollutant” as excluding GHGs seems to
defy all logic, particularly when the Court had explicitly recognized
GHGs as an air pollutant for the purposes of the Act in Massachusetts.128 By holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the term “any air
pollutant” was unreasonable, the Court imposed its own interpretation that excludes GHGs.
In UARG, the Court shifted its focus from the text of the Act,
emphasizing that a reasonable statutory interpretation under Chevron
must account for both the specific context of the provision as well as
the Act-wide context.129 The Court noted that the EPA has given “air
pollutant” a narrower meaning in the context of specific operative
provisions of the CAA.130 Particularly, the EPA has previously interpreted “air pollutant” within the PSD program as limited to only regulated air pollutants.131 The Court in UARG determined that the term
“air pollutant” in this context includes a narrower subset of airborne
compounds that do not include GHGs because, although the Act-wide
definition includes GHGs, the specific context of the provision applies only to a narrower class of “regulated” pollutants.132 Interestingly, the Court relied on the EPA’s past regulations to form this
conclusion rather than evaluating the plain language of the statute
along with Congressional intent.133 The Court also reasoned that, as a
practical matter, PSD cannot apply to “any” air pollutant regulated by
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441.
Id. at 2448.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
Id. at 2439.
Id. at 2439-40.
Id. at 2440.
Id.
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the CAA, but only those pollutants that the EPA can workably regulate under the PSD program without adjusting the numerical threshold limits.134 For these reasons, the Court determined that PSD did
not apply to GHGs, and that the EPA had overstepped its authority.135
The Court in UARG referenced Chevron to support its determinations that the EPA acted impermissibly with respect to the PSD
program triggering provision and permissibly with respect to the
BACT provision,136 when in fact, this reasoning does not comport
with Chevron’s command of deference to the EPA,137 or with the
Court’s prior holding in Massachusetts.138 In Massachusetts, the
Court held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” encompassed “all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.”139 However, because the EPA has previously interpreted the PSD permitting trigger
language “any air pollutant” to include only regulated air pollutants,
the Court in UARG determined that the PSD provision can apply only
to a “narrower, context-appropriate” subset, which does not include
GHGs.140
The Court in UARG failed to acknowledge that the EPA’s
course of conduct was in direct response to the Court’s finding in
Massachusetts that the words “air pollutant” in § 202(a)(1) includes
carbon dioxide.141 The Court in Massachusetts rejected a variety of
efforts by the EPA to exempt GHGs from the plain language of the
CAA.142 It held that GHGs are “air pollutants” within the meaning of
the Act and that their unique characteristics or the possible economic
and administrative consequences of regulation were not a basis upon
which to avoid the CAA’s requirements.143
134

UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445.
Id. at 2449.
136
Id.
137
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
138
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
139
Id. at 528-29; 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Congress typically uses the “expansive” word
“any” to further broaden the application of a given definition. United States v. Gonzalez,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).
140
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
141
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29.
142
Id. at 533 (suggesting that even a “laundry list of reasons not to regulate” has nothing
to do with whether GHG emissions contribute to global climate change, and does not support
noncompliance with the CAA’s clear statutory commands).
143
Id. at 534-35; see also Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (explaining that “emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the [CAA]”).
135
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Furthermore, the Court in Massachusetts explained that the
EPA need not “resolve massive problems” like GHG emissions “in
one fell regulatory swoop.”144 Instead, it continued, the EPA may
“whittle away at them over time, refining [its] preferred approach as
circumstances change and as [the EPA] develops a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed.”145 The Court in UARG attempted to reconcile its conclusion with the holding in Massachusetts by
drawing a distinction between the “[a]ct-wide definition” and the definition used for specific provisions.146
As a result, the Court in UARG impermissibly substituted its
own judgment in place of the EPA’s judgment, in contravention of its
prior holdings in both Chevron and Massachusetts. This apparent inconsistency in reasoning suggests that the EPA’s authority to apply
various provisions of the CAA to GHG emissions is subject to caseby-case determinations made by the courts. Arguably, this approach
to the Act is significantly less efficient and clear than the EPA’s solution, as it may lead to continued case-by-case determinations of
whether the EPA may regulate GHGs throughout operative provisions of the Act.
The Court impermissibly evaluated the potential administrative and economic impact of including GHGs in the term “any air
pollutant” in order to conclude that the EPA may not regulate GHGs
under PSD and Title V. Such an analysis is not permitted by the
plain text of the Act, nor by the Court’s prior holding in Massachusetts.147 Acknowledging its departure from the plain meaning of the
phrase “any air pollutant,” the Supreme Court in UARG made the assertion that the regulation of GHGs under PSD and Title V would be
inconsistent with the design and structure of the CAA.148 The Court
reasoned that the administrative and economic costs of regulation
suggest that the EPA’s view cannot be a “reasonable construction” of
the Act.149 The Court used a results-driven analysis to conclude that
the application of PSD and Title V permitting to sources emitting
GHGs would result in “plainly excessive demands on limited gov144
145
146
147
148
149

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524.
Id.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
Id.
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ernmental resources” and expand the EPA’s authority beyond Congress’s intent.150
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion asserted that the majority
created “an atextual greenhouse gas exception to the phrase ‘any air
pollutant.’ ”151 Indeed, it appears as though the term “any air pollutant” would be inclusive of GHGs by virtue of the word “any.” Although the Court acknowledged that the EPA’s interpretation of the
phrase is “plausible,” the Court concluded that the results would be
unreasonable, as they would require a great number of small sources
to obtain permits.152 While the Court need not exclude GHGs from
the set of “any air pollutant,” neither the Court nor the EPA could
fathom the application of the existing numerical threshold limits to
GHGs because of the number of sources that would be required to
obtain a permit.153 The Court resolved this concern by concluding
that GHGs are not “air pollutants” for the purpose of the PSD provision.154 The EPA resolved this concern by enacting the Tailoring
Rule, which is discussed below.
B.

The Court in UARG Held that the EPA Exceeded
Its Authority by Enacting the Tailoring Rule

As for its second holding, the Court determined that the EPA
exceeded its authority by enacting the Tailoring Rule.155 Unlike the
first holding, in this portion of the opinion, the Court championed adherence to the plain text of the statute.156 Specifically, the Court
found that the EPA exceeded its authority when it adjusted the numerical limitations for PSD and Title V permitting to provide meaningful limits for GHGs.157 Denouncing the Tailoring Rule for its departure from the plain language of the Act,158 the Court, instead of
150

Id. at 2444.
Id. at 2452 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152
Id. at 2446.
153
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-43 (“[A]nnual permit applications would jump from about
800 to nearly 82,000; annual administrative costs would swell from $12 million to over $1.5
billion; and decade-long delays in issuing permits would become common, causing construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”).
154
Id. at 2444.
155
Id. at 2445-46.
156
Id. at 2444-45.
157
Id. at 2442.
158
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
151
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acknowledging the inherent inconsistency in the Act between the
terms “any air pollutant” and the numerical threshold limits provided
by the PSD provision, invalidated the Tailoring Rule.159
The Court ruled that because the EPA is not permitted to “rewrite clear statutory terms,” the EPA’s promulgation of the Tailoring
Rule was not entitled to Chevron deference.160 However, the Court
failed to consider Congress’s silence with respect to threshold limits
that could workably apply to GHGs. Since PSD’s numerical threshold limits cannot feasibly be applied to GHG-emitting sources (a
point agreed upon by both the Court and the EPA), and the Act does
not specifically mention GHGs, at least arguably, it can be presumed
that the CAA is silent or ambiguous with respect to threshold limits
for GHGs. Thus, pursuant to Chevron, in such cases when Congress
is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute, courts must defer to the administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation. But here, rather than
deferring to the agency’s interpretation, the Court held that the EPA
had no authority to tailor the numerical requirements for GHGs.161
Presuming the CAA is indeed ambiguous with respect to numerical threshold limits for GHGs, the EPA would be authorized to
make a reasonable construction of the statute under Chevron. The
Tailoring Rule was an attempt to reconcile the “any air pollutant”
language of the PSD provision and Title V with the statutory threshold limits for air pollutants. The Court could have permitted the
EPA’s promulgation of the Tailoring Rule in this respect, as it was an
attempt to resolve a statutory inconsistency while complying with
Congress’s intent.162
Instead, this holding diverged from the Massachusetts mandate that the EPA has liberal discretion with regard to the regulation
of harmful pollutants if they place public health and welfare at risk.163
Rather than compelling the EPA to act upon its Endangerment Finding, the Court prohibited the EPA from requiring PSD permits for
sources emitting 100,000 tons a year of GHGs.164 By refusing to allow the EPA to exercise its duty to address quantities of GHGs emit159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 2446.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §7470(1); Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
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ted by major sources, the Court prevented the EPA from abiding by
the rule in Massachusetts that the EPA must act when it perceives a
danger to public health and safety.165
Moreover, Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, failed
to acknowledge in UARG an important and relevant holding in Massachusetts: the EPA cannot avoid an Endangerment Finding based on
its belief that regulating GHGs would be overly burdensome, and, if
the EPA finds that GHGs pose a danger (i.e., makes an Endangerment Finding), the agency must regulate them.166 This omission
permits a presumption that the EPA acted unreasonably in promulgating the Tailoring Rule, whereas the EPA was actually doing precisely
what the Court in Massachusetts directed. Arguably, the EPA addressed the conflict posed by GHG emissions and the statutory
threshold limits as efficiently as possible under the CAA’s terms and
pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress when it implemented
the Tailoring Rule.167 When an agency faces conflicting statutory
commands, it “may deviate no further from the statute than is needed
to protect congressional intent.”168 The EPA’s interpretation was arguably fully consistent with its authority as well as the Congressional
intent behind the CAA.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, pointed out that Congress’s intent underlying the 250 tons per year threshold was to limit PSD’s
obligations to larger sources rather than imposing regulatory burdens
upon smaller sources.169 The EPA’s interpretation acknowledged this
concern by promulgating the Tailoring Rule, which exempted the
smaller GHG emitting sources in order to avoid placing undue administrative burdens upon sources which Congress never intended to
apply to permits.170 Therefore, not only was the EPA’s definition
plausible, it was directly aligned with the Congressional intent in two
respects: (1) to subject only larger sources with greater ability to bear
the burden of permitting requirements to the PSD requirements171 and
(2) for the EPA to take action to protect public health and welfare by

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
Id.
See generally Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514.
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2450-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,533.
Id.
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regulating GHG emissions.172
The Court’s adherence to the plain language of PSD for the
purpose of invalidating the Tailoring Rule,173 just after holding that
GHGs should be excluded from the PSD provision category of “any
air pollutant,” obviates the flawed reasoning in this opinion.174 The
effect of GHG emissions is a pressing concern of both Congress and
the EPA.175 The legislative intent behind the CAA bestows upon the
EPA the authority to interpret and construct the CAA in order to protect public health and welfare.176 Furthermore, the EPA carried out
the PSD and Title V permitting programs in a manner that contemplated both expressed congressional objectives and prior holdings of
the Supreme Court, as well as the practical realities of implementation.177 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court invalidated the Tailoring
Rule in UARG.
C.

The Court in UARG Held that the Term “Any Air
Pollutant Subject to Regulation under This
Chapter” within the BACT Provision Includes
GHGs

The Court’s determination that the language subjecting “any
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” to BACT is inclusive of GHGs, while also finding that the broader term subjecting
“any air pollutant” to the PSD provision is not inclusive of GHGs, is
counterintuitive.178 The Court stated that the EPA went too far when
it determined that the term “any air pollutant” is inclusive of GHGs
under the PSD provision.179 The Court reasoned that the implications
of the EPA’s proposed definition would be unreasonable and therefore impermissible.180 Nevertheless, the Court determined that “any172
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). Congress specifically contemplates “major emitting facilit[ies]”
as subject to PSD requirements. See id.
173
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
174
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
175
Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497.
176
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
177
Id.
178
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
179
Id.
180
“[T]he dubious breadth of ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers suggests a role
for agency judgment in identifying the subset of pollutants covered by the particular regulatory program at issue.” UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448.
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way sources,” or sources that would be required to obtain PSD permits “anyway” based upon their emissions of pollutants other than
GHGs, must comply with BACT emission standards for GHGs.181
The language of the provision dictates that BACT applies to “any
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”182 The Court
viewed this language as “far less open-ended” than the “any air pollutant” language of PSD and Title V.183
The Court ruled that GHG emissions can be subject to the
BACT provision, and yet cannot be subject to PSD, when the language indicates that emissions of “any air pollutant” are regulated.184
The Court supported its holding that “anyway” sources emitting
GHGs are subject to BACT, while at the same time holding that
GHGs cannot trigger PSD reasoning that “applying BACT to [GHGs]
is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority.”185 The language of the provision dictates that BACT applies to “any pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”186 The Court’s manipulation of the statutory
language failed to show how GHGs do not trigger PSD and yet still
can be subject to BACT.187 Instead, the Court resorted to an application of the Chevron standard of “reasonable interpretation,” and concluded that allowing PSD to apply to GHGs is more unreasonable
than subjecting GHGs to the BACT provision.188 In doing so, the
Court ignored the explicit language of “any air pollutant,” which is
not permitted by Chevron,189 and reached another results-driven conclusion.
The Court clearly and impermissibly substituted its own
judgment for that of the EPA, the expert agency to which Congress
delegated the authority to implement and enforce regulations under
the CAA, in order to make this determination. As the EPA is explic181

UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448-49.
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
183
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448.
184
Id. at 2449.
185
Id. at 2448.
186
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
187
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448.
188
Id.
189
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (noting that it was impermissible for the court to make a distinction that “may well be a sensible one, but . . . is not a distinction that Congress ever articulated itself, or one that the EPA found in the statute”).
182
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itly charged by Congress with the authority to interpret the Act, it is
the Court in this case that overstepped its authority. The decision in
UARG is also directly contrary to the Court’s reasoning in Massachusetts, in which the Court went so far as to say that the EPA is mandated to regulate “any air pollutant” it believes to be a threat.190 The
Court somehow reasoned that the term “any air pollutant” necessarily
implicates agency judgment, when the language of BACT implicates
“each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter,” and when
Congress has already determined which pollutants are covered.191
The fact that the Court read “each pollutant subject to regulation in this chapter” more broadly than “any air pollutant” suggests
that the Court placed undue emphasis on administrative costs at the
expense of public health. The resulting conclusion defies logic, as
GHGs can be regulated by the EPA for sources in clean air areas only
when that source is already subject to PSD and Title V. The Court’s
decision in UARG appears to be founded upon the consideration of
factors that are not permitted by the plain text of the statute. The decision was a departure from the Supreme Court’s prior holdings in
Chevron and Massachusetts, and contravened the clear purpose of the
CAA to protect both the environment and public health from the
damaging effects of air pollution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The EPA is the expert agency delegated by Congress with the
authority to regulate air pollution under the CAA.192 As GHG emissions pose an endangerment to public health and welfare, 193 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the EPA must regulate GHGs as
air pollutants under the CAA.194 The Court clearly stated in Massachusetts that GHGs are air pollutants subject to regulation in the
Act.195 However, in UARG, the Court used alternative reasoning divorced from the plain meaning of “any air pollutant,” and held that
this term is not inclusive of GHGs for the purposes of the PSD provi-

190
191
192
193
194
195

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448.
Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2539-40.
See generally Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 527-28.
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sion and Title V of the Act.196 The EPA’s promulgation of the Tailoring Rule demonstrated that the framework of the CAA is indeed
workable for regulating GHG emissions and protecting the environment from climate change.
The EPA acted in accordance with Congressional intent and
in compliance with the Court’s ruling in Massachusetts when it
promulgated the Tailoring Rule. As the Supreme Court emphasized
in Massachusetts, the CAA must be flexible enough to support the
legislative intent of Congress while protecting the health and welfare
of the public.197 Congress expressly authorized the EPA to make reasonable interpretations of ambiguity in the Act.198 As the numerical
threshold limits provided by PSD and Title V did not contemplate
GHGs, and cannot meaningfully apply to GHGs, the EPA has the authority to resolve such ambiguity. Further, the EPA’s enactment of
the Tailoring Rule was a direct response to the framework provided
by the Court in Massachusetts; however, the Court in UARG impermissibly considered the potential economic and administrative costs
over Congressional intent and the protection of public health and welfare.199
Finally, the Court’s holding that BACT is applicable to GHGs
for “anyway sources” is counterintuitive.200 The Court read “any pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” for BACT purposes as
broader than the term “any air pollutant” for PSD and Title V.201 After effectively contradicting its previous holding in Massachusetts, in
which the Court determined that GHGs were an air pollutant subject
to regulation under the Act, the conclusion that GHGs could not be
included in the term “any air pollutant” for PSD purposes showcases
the Court’s selective application of the plain statutory text geared toward achieving certain results.
The EPA is authorized to promulgate reasonable regulations
that can effectively regulate GHGs under the CAA. Because of the
potential for significant harm to public health and welfare, courts
should support the EPA’s responsibility to regulate GHGs as sup196

UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40.
Id. at 533.
198
Massachusetts, 549 U.S.at 842-43.
199
Id. at 866 n.20 (citing Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524,
55,527 (1976)).
200
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449.
201
Id.
197
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ported by the language of the CAA, as intended by Congress, and as
confirmed in the Supreme Court’s previous GHG decisions. By first
commanding the EPA to regulate (as in Massachusetts), and then
prohibiting meaningful regulation of stationary sources for PSD purposes (as in UARG), the Supreme Court provided the EPA with conflicting law that will likely result in continued litigation depending
upon case-by-case determinations as to which CAA provisions are
applicable to GHGs. The Court’s previous determinations that the
EPA is obligated to promulgate regulations to prevent harms associated with global warming that are both “actual” and “imminent”202
were undercut by its determination in UARG.

202

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
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